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I. INTRODUCTION
Work in the building construction trades, maritime, auto, apparel, and
other labor-intensive occupations, is often dominated by union representation
1
Douglas Rallo created the concept, and coined the term “hedonic damages” in the landmark federal
civil rights case of Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985). He is a 1978 graduate of the John
Marshall Law School in Chicago. Mr. Rallo practices plaintiff’s personal injury and workers compensation
law in Libertyville, Illinois. Mr. Rallo thanks attorney Patrick Cotter for his insightful comments and
guidance in his peer review of this Article.
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of employees. In these types of physically demanding and hazardous work
activities, severe injuries are frequent occurrences. As such, they are an
abundant source of potential business for personal injury lawyers, both for
workers compensation cases and “third party” litigation. The question
presented by this Article is: If a lawyer or law firm were to give things of
value, whether it be cash or gifts, to union officials with the goal of inducing
union officials to steer injured members to those lawyers, could that activity
implicate violations of federal criminal laws?
In answering that question, this Article identifies and explores four
ways in which federal criminal laws may be violated by the aforementioned
activity. It begins with the historical origins of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes including the “honest services” or “intangible rights” theory of
criminal liability, culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in Skilling
v. United States.2 The second applicable statute is the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), as illustrated by United States v.
Parise.3
The Article then proceeds to an analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (the
federal bribery and illegal gratuity statute) and 18 U.S.C. § 1954, which
prohibits the giving of any “thing of value” in the context of a union employee
welfare benefit or employee pension benefit plan.
Finally, the Article presents a hypothetical fact pattern involving
lawyer gift giving as an endeavor to obtain referral of injury cases from union
official recipients, and applies the law to the hypothetical facts. As will
become evident, research shows that criminal law prosecutions have
confronted this type of activity in the past, pursuant to the aforementioned
statutes. A question remains as to whether federal investigating and
prosecuting agencies have the inclination to make this type of criminal
behavior a significant enough priority to bring prosecutions in the future, if
found to exist. The conclusion suggests that they should.
II. MAIL FRAUD, WIRE FRAUD AND THE HONEST SERVICES DOCTRINE
A. Historical Origins
The federal mail fraud statute4 and the federal wire fraud statute5
criminalize “a scheme or artifice to defraud[]” and which uses mails or wires
in furtherance of the scheme.6 To meet the “in furtherance” requirement, it is
not necessary for the defendant to personally participate in the transmission,
2
3
4
5
6

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010).
See generally United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790 (3d Cir. 1998).
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
United States v. Morales-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/7

2016]

STEERING OF INJURY CASES

447

so long as it is reasonably foreseeable that a wire transmission or mailing
would occur in the execution of the scheme.7 Mail and wire fraud are specific
intent crimes.8 Specific intent to defraud does not require proof of “wilfulness
or any other proxy for knowledge of the law[,]” since mistake of law is not a
defense to wire fraud.9 The inferences and meaning taken from the words and
conduct of bribery participants, as showing the requisite intent, are matters
that juries are well capable of assessing.10 Since honest services fraud
involves a scheme that the participants make efforts to conceal,
“circumstantial evidence is usually particularly important in proving the
alleged corruption.”11
The original mail-fraud statute, enacted in 1872, proscribed the use
of mails to advance “any scheme or artifice to defraud.”12 In 1909, “Congress
amended the statute to prohibit . . . ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises.’”13 Over time, the various federal courts of
appeal interpreted the statute to include not only deprivations of money or
property, but also intangible rights.14 The intangible rights theory came to be
known as “honest services” mail fraud.15 There is no requirement that one of
the parties to “honest services” fraud be a public official.16 Honest services
mail fraud applies to private corruption and private employer victims.17
“Honest services fraud occurs when an employee deprives his employer of its
right to have its affairs conducted ‘free from deceit, fraud, dishonesty, conflict
of interest, and self-enrichment,’ and consistent with the employee's fiduciary
duties to the employer.”18 By 1982, all federal courts of appeal had embraced
the honest services theory of fraud.19
B. The McNally Decision
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in the landmark case
of McNally v. United States, that the mail fraud statute was limited to money
or property rights and did not extend to an intangible right of the public to
good government.20 In McNally, prosecutors alleged a self-dealing patronage
7

United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610, 641–42 (2d Cir. 2011).
Morales-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d at 7; United States v. McNeil, 320 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)
(wire fraud).
9
United States v Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 739 (7th Cir. 2015).
10
United States v McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 153 (1st Cir. 2013).
11
United States v. Dimasi, 810 F. Supp. 2d 347, 360 (D. Mass. 2011).
12
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399 (2010).
13
Id.
14
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 355 (1987).
15
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404.
16
United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2006).
17
United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 2002).
18
United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 2009).
19
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 401.
20
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357–59 (1987).
8
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scheme by the petitioners Gray and McNally that defrauded the citizens and
government of Kentucky of “intangible rights” including the right to have the
Commonwealths’ affairs conducted honestly, in violation of the federal mail
fraud statute.21 In particular, the prosecution alleged that a third individual,
Howard P. Hunt, as chairman of the state Democratic Party, had de facto
control over selecting the insurance agencies from which the Commonwealth
would purchase its workman's compensation policies.22 It alleged that
Wombwell Insurance Company (an agent) agreed with Hunt that in exchange
for a continued agency relationship it would share commissions in excess of
$50,000 per year with other insurance agencies specified by him.23 One of
those companies was Seton Investments, which was controlled by Hunt and
Gray, and nominally owned and operated by McNally.24 The Supreme Court
defined the issue as:
[W]hether a state officer violates the mail fraud statute if he
chooses an insurance agent to provide insurance for the State
but specifies that the agent must share its commissions with
other named insurance agencies, in one of which the officer
has an ownership interest and hence profits when his agency
receives part of the commissions.25
The jury convicted petitioners and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.26
The Supreme Court in McNally noted courts of appeal decisions that
described the intangible rights theory as follows: “[A] public official owes a
fiduciary duty to the public, and misuse of his office for private gain is a
fraud.”27 However, the Court read 18 U.S.C. § 1341 as “limited in scope to
the protection of property rights.”28 Applying these principles to the facts, the
Supreme Court found that “the jury was not required to find that the
Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any money or property[]” or “control
over how its money was spent.”29 Nor was the jury instructed “that in the
absence of the alleged scheme the Commonwealth would have paid a lower
premium or secured better insurance.”30 As a result, the Supreme Court held
21

Id. at 352.
Id. at 355–56 (noting that “an individual without formal office may be held to be a public fiduciary
if others rely on him ‘because of a special relationship in the government’ and he in fact makes
governmental decisions. . . . The Court of Appeals held that Hunt was such a fiduciary because he
‘substantially participated in governmental affairs and exercised significant, if not exclusive, control over
awarding the workman's compensation insurance contract to Wombwell and the payment of monetary
kickbacks to Seton.’”) (internal citations omitted).
23
Id. at 360 (assuming, therefore, that Hunt was a state officer).
24
Id. at 353.
25
Id. at 360.
26
United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1292 (6th Cir. 1986).
27
McNally, 483 U.S. at 355.
28
Id. at 360.
29
Id.
30
Id.
22
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that the jury instruction on the substantive mail fraud count permitted a
conviction for conduct outside the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and reversed
the convictions.31
C. Congressional Response to McNally: 18 U.S.C. § 1346
Congress responded in the year following McNally by enacting a new
statute, which stated that, for purposes of the mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes: “[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”32
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW
A. Pre-McNally “Honest Services” Mail Fraud
The facts in United States v. Price show that Herman McMahan was
business manager of Iron Workers Local 601 in Charleston, South Carolina.33
Charles Price was the business and financial agent of Iron Workers Local 808
in Orlando, Florida.34 The duties of McMahan and Price included
representing the union to the public and recruiting new members.35
During his tenure, the financial wellbeing of Local 601 made
dramatic improvement due, in part, to McMahan signing up new members
from outside of South Carolina.36 An F.B.I. investigation into the
membership application process at Local 601 resulted in an indictment of
McMahan and Price, among others.37
The indictment charged that McMahan, as business agent for Local
601, was responsible for certifying to the International Union that applicants
were qualified and to ensure the “proper use, preparation and transmittal of
all the membership applications.”38
The indictment further alleged that:
Price would recommend certain workers for membership and
would then obtain three blank money orders for payment of
the alleged membership fees. These members would be
recommended to Local 601 by Price and McMahan would
approve the applications and in turn receive monies “over
and above the fees set by the union.” In furtherance of this
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
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Id. at 361.
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
United States v. Price, 788 F.2d 234, 235 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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scheme, the defendants caused a Form 7 membership
application, for which they had received monies in excess of
the set fees, to be delivered through the U.S. mails to the
International.39
These facts formed the foundation for the charge that defendants engaged in
a “‘scheme or artifice to defraud the union and its members of their right to
McMahan’s and Price’s faithful and disinterested performance of official
duties, free from corruption, partiality, dishonesty and fraud,’ in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1341.”40 McMahan and Price were convicted.41
On appeal, defendants contended that economic loss or injury to the
union was an essential element of a § 1341 mail fraud scheme to deprive the
union of their “faithful and honest-services” and, since economic loss or
injury to the union was neither alleged nor proven, the district court erred in
denying their motion for judgment of acquittal.42
In response, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that §
1341 included a category of deceptive schemes:
[W]hich operate to deprive individuals of intangible rights or
interests. . . This expansive interpretation was deemed
justified since limiting § 1341 to deprivations of tangible
interests alone would weaken the efficacy of the statute by
excluding from its scope the multifarious schemes which
deprive innocent victims of significant, often constitutionally
protected, intangible rights.43
The Fourth Circuit looked with approval to § 1341 honest services mail fraud
prosecutions of government officials,44 and stated that:
An elected union official who owes the union members and
the public in general faithful and honest services should not
be treated any differently, nor held to any different standard.
In such a case economic injury need not be shown because
the harm caused “lies in the fact that the public official is not
exercising his independent judgment in passing on official
matters.” Thus, the union and its members were not receiving
what they were entitled to, that is the honest and faithful
services of their officials in the exercise of their official
duties. It is in this way that the union was defrauded in this
case, and because the mails were used in furtherance of that
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id. at 236–37 (quoting United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248–49 (8th Cir. 1976)).
See generally United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/7

2016]

STEERING OF INJURY CASES

451

scheme, we affirm the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.45
B. Judicial Response to McNally
The response to McNally was immediate, and is illustrated by the
decision in United States v. Runnels.46 Frank Runnels was president of Local
22 of the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”) union. Runnels was charged
in a two-count indictment with mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail
fraud:
The scheme charged involved the steering by Runnels of
workers’ compensation claims of retired auto workers to
attorney Arnold Shapero and another attorney. In return for
up-front money, as well as a monthly payment, Runnels
would allow Shapero to attend the monthly luncheon for new
retirees. Runnels would indicate to the retirees that Shapero
and his law firm were the recommended attorneys for Local
22. The retirees would have their “right” to file postemployment workers’ compensation claims explained to
them and, at least indirectly, were encouraged to file such
claims. Hundreds of claims were in fact filed.47
The government proceeded against defendant on an “intangible
rights” theory, namely that defendant schemed to defraud the members of
Local 22 of their right to have the business of the local “conducted honestly,
fairly, impartially, free from corruption, collusion, partiality, disloyalty,
dishonesty and fraud.”48 This was based on the fiduciary duty under law
between a labor leader and his union members.49
“Runnels’ defense was that he took no money from [the attorneys]
and was only acting in the interest of his membership in seeing that they had
good legal representation easily available to them.”50 Specifically:
Runnels argues that Local 22 was not harmed, because its
members received their full workers’ compensation and the
attorneys’ fees were limited by state law and set by a state
agency. The assumption underlying this argument, that the
choice of a lawyer had no economic value, is belied by the
facts. Shapero was willing to pay, and paid, $ 2,000 per
month to ensure that Runnels would steer work from
members of Local 22 to his firm. That money should have
45
46
47
48
49
50
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Price, 788 F.2d at 237 (internal citation omitted).
See generally United States v. Runnels, 877 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 482–83.
Id. at 483.
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gone to the union members, not Runnels. Runnels could have
negotiated a lower fee for the members of Local 22.
Alternatively, he could have used that money to provide any
of a variety of benefits to the members of Local 22. Had the
choice of a lawyer been without value, Shapero would not
have paid to influence it.51
Runnels was convicted by a jury on both counts of the indictment.52
While the case was on rehearing, en banc, in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court decided McNally.53 Since the defendant was
charged with an intangible rights theory in depriving union members of their
right to an honestly run union, the McNally decision required that Runnels’
convictions be reversed.54 However, the Sixth Circuit editorialized that “[i]t
is unfortunate indeed that a conviction has to be reversed in a case in which
the evidence so clearly established wrongful conduct on the part of the
defendants.”55
So, too, was the holding in United States v. Price.56 After their
convictions for honest services mail fraud were affirmed, the United States
Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of McNally.57
On remand, the Fourth Circuit noted that: “The trial instructions, which stated
that the jury could find the defendants guilty without finding that the
defendants had defrauded anyone of money or tangible property, constitute
prejudicial error after McNally.”58 The case was remanded to the district court
with instructions to reverse the convictions and dismiss the indictment.59
C. Post-Amendment Decisions Before Skilling
In United States v. Boyd, an “honest services” criminal prosecution
was brought against several officials of the United Transportation Union
(“UTU”).60 The UTU is a labor union representing railroad, bus, airline and
mass transit employees and retirees.61
As a labor organization, the UTU is subject to the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”).
51
United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1186 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Price, 788 F.2d
234, 237 (4th Cir. 1986) (in an “honest services” prosecution of union officials, “economic injury need not
be shown because the harm” stems from the fact that the official “is not exercising his independent
judgment in passing on official matters.”).
52
Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1188.
53
United States v. Runnels, 877 F.2d 483–85 (6th Cir. 1989).
54
Id. at 490.
55
Id.
56
United States v. Price, 857 F.2d 234, 236 (4th Cir. 1988)
57
McMahan v. United States, 483 U.S. 1015, 1015 (1987).
58
Price, 857 F.2d at 236.
59
Id.
60
United States v. Boyd, 309 F. Supp. 2d 908, 910 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
61
Id.
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Section 501(a) of the LMRDA imposes several fiduciary
duties on UTU’s officers and agents, and section 432(a)(4)
mandates that the UTU’s officers and agents file annual
reports disclosing any income or other benefit with monetary
value derived from any business dealings with the UTU.62
The defendant Boyd, president of the UTU, and others were indicted based
upon allegations that the defendants devised and implemented a fraudulent
scheme to defraud the UTU and its membership of their honest services.63 In
particular, the scheme involved secret cash payments from attorneys who
hoped to acquire or maintain a place on the union’s list of Designated Legal
Counsel (“DLC”).64 The “cash payments were allegedly used to fund
defendants’ union campaigns and for their personal use.”65
The defendant Boyd moved for dismissal of the indictment on several
grounds.66 First, Boyd argued that the honest services fraud “[did] not amount
to a crime as a matter of law because” the indictment did “not include any
allegation of actual or intended harm to the UTU or its membership[;]” in
other words, Boyd’s conduct did not lead to the appointment of incompetent
attorneys on the DLC, or that the union suffered economic loss.67 The
government pointed to the indictment, which contradicted Boyd’s claim that
the designated legal counsel were chosen on the basis of legal skill and fidelity
to union members, when in truth the attorneys and Boyd were financially
beholden to one another.68 Second, Boyd argued that the LMRDA’s 432(a)(4)
reporting requirement only required reporting benefits from entities from
which the UTU purchased goods or services, and that the UTU did not
purchase goods or services from the DLC attorneys.69 Finally, Boyd argued
that the LMRDA contained its own enforcement mechanism to remedy
election abuses without criminal prosecution for honest services fraud.70
Boyd’s arguments were rejected.71 The court found support for its denial of
the motion in the duties Boyd owed to the UTU and its members under 29
U.S.C. § 501(a) of the LMRDA, article 16 of the UTU Constitution, 29 U.S.C.
§ 432(a)(4) and 29 U.S.C. § 481(g).72 Further, the indictment alleged a breach
of these duties by Boyd engaging in commercial bribery.73 The court ruled
that “an indictment alleging honest services fraud need not explicitly allege
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Published by eCommons, 2015

Id. (internal citation omitted); see generally 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).
Boyd, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 911–12.
Id.
Id. at 912, 914.
Id. at 913, 914.
Id. at 913.

454

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

actual or material harm to the victims.”74 “The Government need only prove
that the defendant’s false representations were material. The materiality
element is satisfied if the misinformation or omissions ‘would naturally tend
to lead or [are] capable of leading a reasonable employer to change its
conduct.’”75 Applying these principles to the facts, the district court held that
if the breaches of duty alleged above were true, they would “naturally tend to
prompt a reasonable employer to take measures to correct and prevent against
such conduct in the future.”76 The court also held that an honest services fraud
claim would not be pre-empted by the civil enforcement provisions of the
LMRDA.77
Although it did not involve labor unions, the case of United States v.
Hausmann was about defendant Hausmann, a Wisconsin personal injury
lawyer, who referred certain of his clients to defendant Rise, a chiropractor.78
Dr. Rise was paid for chiropractic services from insurance proceeds.79 In
return, Rise made corresponding payments, equal to twenty percent of the fees
he collected for those services, to various third parties at Hausmann’s
direction.80 Those payments totaled $77,062.87 and included $14,900 for
handyman services, almost $32,000 to a lawyer and chiropractor marketing
firm, and $2,000 for landscaping services at Hausmann’s residence.81
The defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit mail and
wire fraud.82 The case came before the Seventh Circuit on Hausmann’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment and Rise’s appeal from the
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.83
Defendant’s first contention was that the government failed to prove
the elements of mail and wire fraud underlying the conspiracy charge.84 The
Seventh Circuit looked to attorney Hausmann’s fiduciary duty to his clients
and to the Seventh Circuit law established in United States v. Bloom,85 which
held that liability under the “intangible rights” theory of the mail and wire
fraud statutes, may apply where “[the] defendant misuses his fiduciary
relationship (or information acquired therefrom) for personal gain.”86 It noted
the client’s dependence upon Hausmann to settle their personal injury claims
and Hausmann’s written representations to clients about the firm’s
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id.
Id.; see also United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 727 (9th Cir. 2012).
Boyd, 309 2d at 914.
Id.
United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 954 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id. at 954–55.
United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 1998).
Hausmann, 345 F.3d at 956.
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compensation for its work.87 It looked to the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules
of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, which provided that a “lawyer may
not allow related business interests to affect [his legal] representation, for
example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an
undisclosed interest.”88 The court noted that the trial proofs demonstrated
“that Hausmann gained over $70,000 in kickback payments made to third
parties for his personal benefit or entities in which he had some interest[] . . .
and that such concealed payments deprived clients of the intangible right of
honest services.”89
The defendants contended that Rise’s payment to third parties as
directed by Hausmann were not kickbacks, but were the legitimate spending
of income derived from the use of fees to which Rise was legally entitled.90
“They maintain that Hausmann’s clients had no right to the settlement funds
paid to Rise nor, consequently, to the allocation of twenty percent of those
funds to expenditures designated by Hausmann.”91 The court rejected this
argument and explained that:
This reasoning ignores the reality that Hausmann deprived
his clients of their right to know the truth about his
compensation: In addition to one third of any settlement
proceeds he negotiated on their behalf, every dollar of Rise’s
effective twenty percent fee discount went to Hausmann’s
benefit. Insofar as Hausmann misrepresented this
compensation, that discount should have inured to the benefit
of his clients. It is of no consequence, despite Appellants’
arguments to the contrary, that Rise’s fees (absent his
discount) were competitive, or that clients received the same
net benefit as they would have absent the kickback scheme.
The scheme itself converted Hausmann’s representation to
his clients into misrepresentations, and Hausmann illegally
profited at the expense of his clients, who were entitled to his
honest services as well as their contractually bargained-for
portion of Rise’s discount.92
Lastly, the court determined that the applicable law was not
unconstitutionally vague, did not impermissibly rely on criminal statutes to
enforce the terms of a private contract, nor violate principles of federalism by
criminalizing conduct that is regulated by state law.93
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Published by eCommons, 2015

Id. at 954–55.
Id. at 956.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id. at 958–59.

456

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

D. The Skilling Decision
In Skilling v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
significantly restricted the “intangible rights” theory of mail and wire fraud,
as reinstated by § 1346.94 Skilling originated in the downfall of Enron
Corporation, a major energy company.95 A government investigation
uncovered a conspiracy to elevate Enron’s stock prices by exaggerating the
company’s financial wellbeing.96 This led to the defendant Skilling, an Enron
executive, being charged with a scheme to deceive Enron’s shareholders by
manipulating Enron’s publicly reported financial results and making false
public statements about Enron’s financial performance.97 Skilling was
convicted of multiple counts against him, “including the honest-servicesfraud conspiracy charge[] . . . .”98
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Skilling argued that
18 U.S.C. § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague.99 In response, the Court
decided to construe, rather than invalidate, the law.100 It began by pointing
out that, immediately following McNally, Congress passed a new statute (§
1346) to specifically include “the intangible right of honest services” within
the definitions of the mail fraud (§ 1341) and wire fraud (§ 1343) statutes.101
The Court believed that Congress, by enacting § 1346, “meant to reinstate the
body of pre-McNally honest-services law[] . . . .”102 The Court observed that,
while the honest services doctrine occasioned divergent holdings from the
Courts of Appeals, “[t]he ‘vast majority’ [or “core” of the pre-McNally] cases
involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in
bribery or kickback schemes.”103 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled “that
[§] 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally
case law.”104 “[P]roscrib[ing] a wider range of offensive conduct[] . . . would
raise [] due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.”105
1. The Fiduciary Duty of Union Officials
Skilling’s requirement for breach of fiduciary duty in honest services
fraud cases is directly applicable to union officials.106 In United States v.
94

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 364 (2010).
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United States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 722 (9th Cir. 2012) (interpreting Skilling for the
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1341 and 1346).
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Boffa, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that:
There is little doubt that union officials owe union members
a fiduciary duty. Section 501(a) of the Labor Management
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMDRA), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
declares that union officials “occupy positions of trust in
relation to such organization and its members as a group” and
provides that “it is the duty of each such person . . . to refrain
from dealing with such organizations as an adverse party in
any matter connected with his duties and from holding or
acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts
with the interests of such organization . . . .” This section
imposes fiduciary responsibility in its broadest sense, and is
not confined to financial dealings by union officials. [Thus,]
the LMDRA established, as a matter of federal law, union
members’ right to the honest and faithful services of union
officials.107
The United States Supreme Court has also stated it is “beyond
dispute” that a fiduciary relationship exists “under any definition of that
term,” in the context of official union members.108 It naturally follows,
therefore, “that a scheme to defraud employees of the loyal, faithful, and
honest services of their union official alleges a crime within the scope of the
mail fraud statute.”109
Business managers and business representatives of a union local are
“officers, agents, shop stewards, or other representatives” of a union within
the meaning of the LMRDA and occupy positions of trust with fiduciary
duties to the local.110 The right of union members to have the loyal services
of union officials constitutes an intangible property right.111 Because § 501
details the duties owed and the persons from and to whom they are owed, §
501 is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness, as measured against the
standards of Skilling v. United States.112
However, in United States v. Rybicki, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that “[b]ecause federal law imposes special duties of loyalty
on union officials, analysis of such cases may depart from analysis of other

107

United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 930–31 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted).
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 407 n.41.
Boffa, 688 F.2d at 931.
110
McCabe v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 415 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir. 1969); Saunders v. Hankerson,
312 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Section 501 imposes liability only on individual union officers for
breach of fiduciary obligations, and does not impose any duties on labor organizations as such . . . . [T]he
statute is intended to reach only natural persons.”).
111
United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (Hobbs Act prosecution).
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Id. at 236.
108
109

Published by eCommons, 2015

458

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

private sector cases.”113
2. Traditional Definitions of Bribery and Kickbacks
With Skilling’s limitation of “honest services” mail fraud crime to
bribes and kickbacks, it is useful to look at what types of behavior constitute
bribes and kickbacks. In United States v. Rybicki, a pre-Skilling private sector
honest services fraud case, the court described typical bribery and kickback
cases as involving secret payments to foster or continue “some sort of
business relationship or transaction . . . .”114 One example can be found in
United States v. Anderson.115 In Anderson, the defendant sought approval for
proposed real estate developments in Aurora, Illinois.116 After asking for and
obtaining official action to support his projects, the defendant gave the City
Planning and Development Committee chairman envelopes containing
thousands of dollars in cash.117 The defendant also offered $10,000 in cash to
Aurora’s Director of Public Works for his official help in another project.118
Defendant was charged with, and convicted of, honest services fraud pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and bribery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 666.119
In United States v. Hancock, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the term
kickback . . . is commonly used and understood to include ‘a percentage
payment . . . for granting assistance by one in a position to open up or control
a source of income[] . . . .’”120
Rybicki noted that “[c]ases involving union officials tend to fit the
pattern of the private-sector bribery cases.”121
3. Quid Pro Quo and the “Stream of Benefits” Theory of Bribery
But what if the alleged bribe does not consist of cash-filled envelopes
as in Anderson? What if the steering inducing payments take on a more
camouflaged appearance such as meals, sports tickets, paid golf outings, or
vacations and other gifts; in other words, a stream of benefits in exchange for
official acts? In United States v. Kemp, the defendant Kemp was a former
Philadelphia city treasurer.122 The evidence showed that Ronald White, a
Philadelphia lawyer, showered Kemp with gifts, including transportation and
113
United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 140 n.14 (2d Cir. 2003). Non-union private and public
sector honest services fraud cases are integrated into this Article as deemed relevant by the author.
114
Id. at 139.
115
See generally United States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2008).
116
Id. at 958.
117
Id. at 959.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 960. 18 U.S.C. § 666 is a statute that prohibits corruption of officials who administer state
and local programs receiving federal funds.
120
United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1979); People v. Bynum, 557 N.E.2d 238,
241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
121
Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 140.
122
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2007).
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tickets to a Super Bowl with accommodations and meals, trips to New York
and Detroit, numerous meals, and White also arranged for Kemp to receive
tickets to an NBA All-Star game with its accompanying festivities.123 It was
alleged that White’s corrupt payments and gifts allowed him to acquire
control over Kemp’s decision making, and that Kemp used that control to
direct city contracts to companies that he favored.124 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals described the “stream of benefits” theory of bribery as:
“[P]ayments may be made with the intent to retain the
official’s services on an ‘as needed’ basis, so that whenever
the opportunity presents itself the official will take specific
action on the payor’s behalf.” While the form and number of
gifts may vary, the gifts still constitute a bribe as long as the
essential intent -- a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act -- exists.125
In United States v. Jennings, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained it
this way:
[T]he intended exchange in bribery can be “this for these” or
“these for these,” not just “this for that.” Further, it is not
necessary for the government to prove that the payor
intended to induce the official to perform a set number of
official acts in return for the payments. The quid pro quo
requirement is satisfied so long as the evidence shows a
“course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public
official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable
to the donor.” Thus, all that must be shown is that payments
were made with the intent of securing a specific type of
official action or favor in return. For example, payments may
be made with the intent to retain the official’s services on an
“as needed” basis, so that whenever the opportunity presents
itself the official will take specific action on the payor’s
behalf. This sort of “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch
mine” arrangement constitutes bribery because the payor
made payments with the intent to exchange them for specific
official action.126
In United States v. Bryant, the Third Circuit noted that this
“exchange” has its origins in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, which
stated that bribery requires “a quid pro quo -- a specific intent to give or
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receive something of value in exchange for an official act.”127 Bryant then
held that “‘a quid pro quo may come in the form of a ‘stream of benefits.’”128
Kemp agreed that Sun-Diamond’s statement of the quid pro quo
requirement for bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) “is equally applicable to
bribery in the honest services fraud context[] . . . .”129 United States v.
Kincaid-Chauncey also ruled that in a prosecution for honest services fraud,
“at least an implicit quid pro quo is required.”130 And, while United States v.
Ganim found a quid pro quo requirement in stream of benefits bribery, it
concluded that Sun-Diamond was limited to the statutory context in which the
case arose––18 U.S.C. § 201.131
The “stream of benefits” bribery concept of honest service fraud is
still a viable theory of criminal liability, post-Skilling.132
E. Post-Skilling Decisions
1. Parties Liable for Honest Services Fraud
Can the attorneys who give gifts to union officials be in jeopardy of
prosecution for honest services fraud, in addition to the union official
recipients? The answer appears to be “yes.” In United States v. Urciuoli, the
defendant was former CEO of Roger William’s Medical Center in Rhode
Island.133 The crux of the charge was that defendant bribed––with the pretext
of an employment contract involving modest efforts and substantial
compensation––a Rhode Island state senator for legislative assistance
beneficial to the medical center.134 The defendant was convicted of multiple
counts of honest services mail fraud.135
On appeal, defendant argued that Skilling limited honest services mail
fraud “to cover only the party to a bribe who owes a fiduciary duty . . . .”136
The First Circuit Court of Appeals emphatically rejected the defendant’s
argument, writing that:
Sections 1341 and 1346 by their terms cover anyone who
engages in a “scheme” to deprive others of the intangible
127
United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999).
128
Bryant, 655 F.3d at 241.
129
Kemp, 500 F.3d at 281.
130
United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 2009).
131
United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 2007). For other cases illustrating the stream
of benefits theory of bribery, see United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195, 208 (D.D.C. 2009); United
States v. Dimasi, 810 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (D. Mass 2011); United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th
Cir. 2009).
132
Bryant, 655 F.3d at 241; see also Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012).
133
United States v. Urciuoli, 613 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 2010).
134
Id. at 13.
135
Id.
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Id. at 17.
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right to honest services. The courts . . . have consistently
construed “scheme” in this context to mean that those who
bribe . . . take part in a scheme to deprive . . . of the honest
services of those they attempt to influence. . . . [N]othing in
Skilling’s language or context suggests that the Court was
distinguishing between the fiduciary who received the bribe
and the non-fiduciary who gave it[] . . . .137
2. Jury Instructions and Harmless Error
Although it did not involve dealings between union officials and
lawyers for the referral of personal injury matters, United States v. Rodrigues
applied Skilling principles in a union kickback and steering context.138 In
Rodrigues, the defendant was State Director of the United Public Workers,
AFSME Local 646, AFL-CIO (“UPW”).139 In that capacity, “Rodrigues
negotiated contracts with dental and health insurance providers, . . . on behalf
of UPW members and their families.”140 At Rodrigues’ request, these
providers included “consultation fees” in their contracts.141 “These fees were
effectively to be paid by UPW members as part of their insurance premiums
. . . but the fees eventually ended up in the pockets of persons Rodrigues
designated as the ‘consultants.’”142 Those consultants were (1) Al Loughrin,
who was the stepfather of Rodrigues’ girlfriend and secretary and (2) shell
companies of which Rodrigues’ daughter was “sole shareholder, only
Director, and simultaneously the President, Vice President, Secretary, and
“During the investigation of these relationships and
Treasurer.”143
transactions, it was discovered that neither designated consultant did any real
consulting work on these contracts, and that part of the ‘consultant’s fees’
were diverted to Rodrigues’s personal use[,]” all without knowledge of the
UPW.144
A jury convicted Rodrigues of “theft of honest services” from the
UPW and its members, and numerous other crimes.145 After his conviction
was affirmed, the Supreme Court decided Skilling.146 The jury in Rodrigues
had not been instructed in accordance with Skilling, so the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals had to decide whether that error was harmless.147
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed to the
137
138
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147

Published by eCommons, 2015

Id. at 17–18 (emphasis added).
United States v. Rodrigues, 678 F.3d 693, 696–97 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694–95.
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id.

462

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

Skilling definition of kickback as: “[A]ny money, fee, commission, credit,
gift, gratuity, thing of value, or compensation of any kind which is provided,
directly or indirectly, to [enumerated persons] for the purpose of improperly
obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with [enumerated
circumstances].”148 In its second analytical step, the court looked to the
indictment to ascertain whether Rodrigues had been put on notice that he was
facing charges that qualified as kickbacks.149 It held that it did.150
Next, the court examined the record and found overwhelming
evidence that Rodrigues “steered” consulting fees to his own and his
daughter’s use; namely, to discharge a personal $10,000 loan to a sham
consultant (Al Loughrin) for a sprinkler system installed on Rodrigues’
property, and for a truck purchased by his daughter, but titled in Rodrigues’
name.151
The defense argued that the “consultant’s fees” paid to others could
not qualify as kickbacks because the fees were not paid directly to him.152 In
response, the Ninth Circuit wrote that: “[T]o honor Rodrigues’s argument
would allow a person committing honest services fraud to avoid legal
responsibility simply by directing illegal payments to a co-conspirator. Such
a rule foolishly would create a loop-hole through which all kickbacks could
then slither unchecked, thereby eviscerating § 1346.”153 Finally, “Rodrigues
protests that this fee arrangement cannot be a kickback because it was not the
result of ‘coercion or a secret agreement.’”154 The court rejected this
argument by pointing out that the arrangement kept secret three salient facts:
a) The consultants did no consulting work;
b) Rodrigues was funneling money to his own and his
daughter’s use;
c) The deal increased insurance premiums to UPW
members and their families without any corresponding
benefit.155
The court found this to be “actionable fraud by material omission committed
against the UPW and its members.”156
In resolving the ultimate issue before it, the court looked at the
evidence and found that Rodrigues actually received kickbacks; determined
148
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that the absence of a Skilling kickback instruction did not impair the
fundamental fairness of the trial; and held that if a Skilling kickback
instruction had been given, the verdict would have been the same.157 Thus,
the court held that the omission of a Skilling kickback instruction was
harmless error.158
3. Is Tangible Harm an Element of Honest Services Fraud?
In United States v. Nayak, the defendant owned multiple outpatient
surgery centers.159 To attract business, Nayak made payments to physicians
that referred patients to his centers.160 These bribes and kickbacks included
cash payments and payments for referring physicians’ advertising
expenses.161
Nayak was charged, in an indictment and a superseding information,
with honest services mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346.162
Neither charging instrument alleged that Nayak caused or intended to cause
any tangible harm to the patients in the form of higher costs or inferior care;
in fact, the government conceded to the district court that the scheme did not
cause patients any physical or monetary harm.163 Nayak moved to dismiss,
which was denied by the district court.164 He then entered a conditional guilty
plea, and preserved his right to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(a)(2).165
On appeal, Nayak claimed that actual or intended tangible harm to
the victims was an element of the crime of private corruption of honest
services mail fraud.166 Since this element was not stated in the indictment and
superseding information, he argued that they were legally insufficient.167
At the outset, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the plain
language of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (the post-McNally mail fraud statute).168 It
noted that a literal reading, which specifically contemplated prosecutions
based on deprivations of intangible rights, would defeat defendant’s argument
that the government was required to prove tangible harm to convict him.169
The court acknowledged that some cases within the Circuit had imposed
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limiting constructions on § 1346.170 However, those cases “said nothing about
requiring tangible harm to the victim; it was tangible benefit to the defendant
that triggered federal criminal liability.”171 Despite the fact that the
defendant’s conduct appeared to fall within the confines of § 1346 as
interpreted by Skilling, the defendant urged the Seventh Circuit to create a
limitation of the statute, described as follows:
[A] requirement that the victims of private honest-services
fraud suffer actual or intended tangible harm. Congress, he
argues, accidentally painted with a too-broad brush in § 1346
by stating that all schemes to deprive another of the
intangible right to honest services are schemes to defraud.
According to Nayak, Congress really intended this language
to apply only to schemes by public officials; § 1346,
therefore, does not apply to him.172
Nayak relied on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jain,
which differentiated between private and public corruption cases, and
reasoned that:
When official action is corrupted by secret bribes or
kickbacks, the essence of the political contract is violated.
But in the private sector, most relationships are limited to
more concrete matters. When there is no tangible harm to the
victim of a private scheme, it is hard to discern what
intangible “rights” have been violated. . . . Thus, prior
intangible rights convictions involving private sector
relationships have almost invariably included proof of actual
harm to the victims’ tangible interests.173
The Seventh Circuit rejected Nayak’s reliance on Jain for several reasons.174
First, there is no textual basis in § 1346 for distinguishing private versus
public corruption and “§ 1346 applies exclusively to the intangible right of
honest services, so tangible harm need not be shown.”175 Second, the
Supreme Court in Skilling explicitly stated that “§ 1346[] appli[es] to state
and local corruption and to private-sector fraud.”176
Next, Nayak argued that the Skilling court “did not explicitly
determine what elements are required to prove a violation of § 1346 by a
private actor.”177 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals responded to this
170
171
172
173
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175
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argument as follows: “True, but it did not need to: it is contradictory to require
the government to show actual or intended tangible harm when the crime
being prosecuted is defined as causing or intending to cause intangible
harm.”178
Finally, Nayak pointed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
private corruption case of United States v. Hausmann, which he read as
requiring tangible harm to the victim.179 In particular, “Nayak seize[d] on the
language requiring that the [illegal] scheme must be ‘at the expense’ of the
defendant’s victims, arguing that this [language] requires a showing of
tangible harm in private corruption cases.”180 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals went on to explain that:
Hausmann did not say that the “expense” to the victim had to
be a tangible one. . . . Rather, what we found objectionable
was the intangible harm that Hausmann’s clients suffered
when their lawyer violated his fiduciary duty and deprived
them of his honest services[] . . . . Nayak’s Hausmann
argument conflates harm with tangibility.181
In summary, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:
[I]t is clear that Congress thought that the victims of fraud
could be harmed even if the harm was only intangible—that
was the purpose behind enacting § 1346. Although the
schemes in many of our private corruption precedents had a
pecuniary impact on the person to whom a fiduciary duty was
owed, we have never said that tangible harm is required in
such a case. Indeed, the intangible harm from a fraud can
often be quite substantial, especially in the context of the
doctor—patient relationship, where patients depend on their
doctor—more or less completely—to provide them with
honest medical services in their best interest. Even where a
less important fiduciary interest is at play, though, the mail
fraud statutes are clear: no showing of tangible harm to a
victim is necessary.182
Therefore, Nayak’s mail fraud charge was sufficiently alleged, and his
conviction was affirmed.183
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IV. RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
is a federal statute, which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.184
The government must prove the following four elements in order to obtain a
conviction under RICO:
1) [T]he existence of an enterprise affecting [interstate]
commerce;
2) [T]hat the defendant was employed by or associated with
the enterprise;
3) [T]hat the defendant participated, either directly or
indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise;
and
4) [T]hat he or she participated through a pattern of
racketeering activity.185
The statute defines an enterprise as “any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity[] . . . .”186
In United States v. Parise, “the [National Maritime Union (“NMU”)]
represent[ed] merchant marine seafarers who work[ed] on commercial
shipping vessels.”187 A government investigation into corruption within the
NMU uncovered a bribery scheme devised and implemented by Louis Parise
Sr. (president of the NMU), his son Louis Parise Jr., and several attorney
employees of the Sacks law firm.188 In 1988, the Sacks law firm hired Parise
Jr. as an investigator “responsible for delivering the bribes to the [union] port
agents.”189 “Parise Sr. promised these legal referrals to Sacks in exchange for
a kickback of 5% of the legal fees generated through NMU cases.”190 A Legal
Services Plan (“LSP”) was created in 1992 “through which attorneys were to
184

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012).
United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 794 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Console, 13 F.3d
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provide low or no cost legal services to union members. It was hoped that
these members would then be more likely to retain [certain] attorneys,
including Sacks, for their more lucrative cases. Parise Jr. was named ‘coadministrator’ of the LSP.”191
Parise Jr. was found guilty of violating the RICO statute “based on
the jury’s finding that Parise Jr. had bribed Pegan and Rywelski in violation
of Pennsylvania’s commercial bribery statute.”192 On appeal, Parise Jr. first
argued that the government failed to connect him with the indicted
“enterprise” because several of the racketeering acts charged in the indictment
were committed prior to the LSP being formed in September 1992.193 The
appellate court noted that a RICO “enterprise” “is ‘an ongoing organization’
whose ‘various associates function as a continuing unit[;]’ however,
‘continuity does not require that each member of the enterprise participate in
it from beginning to end.’”194 The court noted that upon its formation, the
LSP became part of the ongoing enterprise and was developed as another
method of generating personal injury cases.195 “The major participants in the
enterprise remained essentially the same from 1988 on, demonstrating the
continuity of the enterprise.”196 Thus, even though the LSP came into
existence several years after the NMU Enterprise was formed, Parise Jr.’s
actions prior to 1992 could properly support his RICO conviction.197
“Parise Jr. next asserts that all of the racketeering charges -- even
those relating to post-1992 activity -- are deficient because the government
failed to connect any of his alleged acts of bribery with his position as coadministrator of the LSP.”198 The appellate court rejected this argument and
held that the defendant’s conviction could be sustained without proof that his
participation in the affairs of the enterprise flowed from his official role in the
LSP.199 RICO requires that a defendant be employed by or associated with
an enterprise.200 To establish “association,” it only need be shown that a
defendant be aware of the general nature of the enterprise and that the
enterprise extends beyond his individual role.201 Since the evidence showed
that Parise Jr. “attended the initial meeting during which the bribery scheme
was discussed[,]” this established the element of association.202
The third element necessary for a RICO conviction is whether the
191
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defendant participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs.203 Citing the
United States Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young, the appellate court
held “that RICO liability may extend to those who do not hold a managerial
position within an enterprise, but who . . . knowingly further the illegal aims
of the enterprise by carrying out the directives of those in control.”204 On this
point, the court found that Parise Jr. participated in the conduct of the affairs
of the NMU Enterprise for several years before he was given the formal title
of "co-administrator" of the LSP.205 “In his role as investigator for the Sacks
law firm, Parise Jr. was integral to the enterprise’s plan to funnel personal
injury cases to Sacks in order to reap a percentage of the money generated.”206
It observed that Parise Jr. travelled to various cities “paying off the union
agents and informing them that Sacks was the official NMU attorney for the
East Coast.”207 Parise Jr. was acting at the direction of his union president
father who, as head of the enterprise, received substantial kickbacks from
Sacks.208 In 1992, when Parise Jr. became co-administrator of the LSP, he not
only continued his payoffs of port agents, he also coordinated the efforts of
LSP to select local attorneys to do the routine work for union members, and
to channel more lucrative cases to attorneys selected by Parise Sr.209 At trial,
Sacks testified that Parise Jr. was present during the original meeting where
the bribery plan was discussed.210 The court decided that on these facts, “the
jury could easily conclude that the government established a nexus between
Parise Jr. and the affairs of the NMU Enterprise.”211
Finally, “[i]n order to prove a RICO violation, the government must
demonstrate that the defendant participated in the operation of an enterprise
‘through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .’”212 The indictment alleged
that Parise Jr. violated Pennsylvania’s commercial bribery statute by paying
union agents to refer personal injury cases to Sacks.213 On this point, Parise
Jr. argued that giving money to union employees for referral of personal
injury cases did not constitute “conduct in relation to the affairs of the union”
for purposes of the state’s commercial bribery statute.214 In essence, Parise’s
argument was “that because referring seamen to lawyers [was] not included
among a port agent’s official duties, it could not constitute ‘conduct in relation
to the affairs of’ the employer.”215 He asserted that the union had “no interest
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Id. (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993)).
Parise, 159 F.3d at 797.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 802–03.
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or stake in which lawyer an injured worker chooses, and that providing legal
referrals is not within the scope of the port agents’ employment.”216 The
appellate court disagreed.217 The constitution of the NMU described one of
its purposes as helping its “‘needy, sick and distressed’ members.”218 The
average seaman was not well educated or literate.219 The union president
“circulated a letter in which he named individual lawyers as the official ‘union
attorneys’ for particular geographic regions.”220 “Sacks was named as the
official attorney for the East Coast and was given office space in the union
hall in New Orleans.”221 “Union members testified that they relied on [union]
port agents for attorney referrals after suffering an on-the-job injury.”222
Based on those facts, the appellate court concluded that providing attorney
referrals constituted “conduct in relation to the affairs of the union.”223
In summary, given the unique relationship between the union, its
members, and the port agents, the jury could reasonably find that
Pennsylvania’s commercial bribery statute had been violated and that this
could form a predicate for purposes of RICO.224 The defendant’s conviction
was affirmed.225
V. BRIBERY AND ILLEGAL GRATUITIES
Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 is a federal statute prohibiting bribery and
illegal gratuities.226 As explained by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers of California:
Subsection (a) of § 201 sets forth definitions
216

Id. at 798–99.
Id. at 793.
218
Id. at 801.
219
Id. at 802.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 803.
224
Id. The Illinois commercial bribery statute states that “[a] person commits commercial bribery when
he confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the
consent of the latter's employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his
employer’s or principal’s affairs.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29A–1 (West 1993). The Illinois district
court noted that “[o]nly certain state offenses which are . . . ‘punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year’ constitute ‘racketeering activity’ under the RICO statute.” Perino v. Mercury Fin. Co. of Ill., 912
F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Ill. 1995). At the time of the Perino decision in 1995, commercial bribery in Illinois
was only punishable by a fine not exceeding $5,000, and therefore, could not trigger RICO. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(A). However, effective January 1, 2004, the sentencing provision for commercial bribery, 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29A-3 (West 1995), was amended to create a two-tiered sentence: (a) for benefits
less than $500,000, commercial bribery is a Class A misdemeanor; and (b) for benefits of $500,000 or
more, commercial bribery is a Class 3 felony.
225
Parise, 159 F.3d at 804. Subsequent to the appellate court’s affirmance, defendant filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Parise v. United States, No. 96-273-2, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9034 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000). He claimed that since each of the bribe payments were made
to union agents outside of Pennsylvania, he did not violate that state’s commercial bribery statute. The
court found that the statute did not have extra-territorial effect, granted the petition, and vacated his
convictions. Id.
226
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
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applicable to the section -- including a definition of “official
act,” § 201(a)(3). Subsections (b) and (c) then set forth,
respectively, two separate crimes -- or two pairs of crimes, if
one counts the giving and receiving of unlawful gifts as
separate crimes -- with two different sets of elements and
authorized punishments. The first crime, described in §
201(b)(1) as to the giver, and § 201(b)(2) as to the recipient,
is bribery, which requires a showing that something of value
was corruptly given, offered, or promised to a public official
(as to the giver) or corruptly demanded, sought, received,
accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a public
official (as to the recipient) with intent, inter alia, “to
influence any official act” (giver) or in return for “being
influenced in the performance of any official act” (recipient).
The second crime, defined in § 201(c)(1)(A) as to the giver,
and § 201(c)(1)(B) as to the recipient, is illegal gratuity,
which requires a showing that something of value was given,
offered, or promised to a public official (as to the giver), or
demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be
received or accepted by a public official (as to the recipient),
“for or because of any official act performed or to be
performed by such public official.” The distinguishing
feature of each crime is its intent element. Bribery requires
intent “to influence” an official act or “to be influenced” in
an official act, while illegal gratuity requires only that the
gratuity be given or accepted “for or because of” an official
act. In other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo
- a specific intent to give or receive something of value in
exchange for an official act. An illegal gratuity, on the other
hand, may constitute merely a reward for some future act that
the public official will take (and may already have
determined to take), or for a past act that he has already
taken.227
This law, by its terms, references the giving of something of value to “a public
official.”228 The statute defines a “public official” as “an officer or employee
or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department,
agency or branch of Government thereof[] . . . in any official function, under
or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government[] .
. . .”229
227
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201
(2012)).
228
Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404.
229
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012).
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In Dixson v. United States, the issue before the Supreme Court was
the meaning of the term “public official,” in the federal bribery statute.230 The
city of Peoria had received two federal block grants that were funded through
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (“HCDA”).231 The
Act was passed by Congress to address the social, economic, and
environmental problems facing cities.232 As a federal block grant, the
expenditure of federal funds and the day-to-day administration of the program
were delegated to state and local authorities; however, the federal government
retained control to assure compliance with statutory objectives and
implementing regulations.233 Peoria designated United Neighborhoods, Inc.
(“UNI”), a social service organization, as the city’s sub-grantee to administer
the federal block grant funds.234 UNI hired petitioner Dixson, who became
responsible for contracting and fiscal control.235 “Petitioner Hinton’s duties
included contracting with persons applying for housing rehabilitation
assistance, and contracting with demolition firms.”236 The petitioners were
indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 201(a), which charged that they used their
positions to receive “$ 42,604 in kickbacks from contractors seeking to work
on UNI’s housing rehabilitation projects.”237 Petitioners moved to dismiss the
indictment on the theory that “as executives of a private nonprofit corporation
unaffiliated with the Federal Government, they were never ‘public officials’”
within the contemplation of the statute.238 Their motions were denied, they
were convicted as charged, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.239
In the Supreme Court, petitioners argued that they could not have
acted “‘for or on behalf of the United States’ because neither they nor their
employer UNI ever entered into any agreement with the United States or any
subdivision of the Federal Government.”240 The government’s view of a
“public official” was that the term covered persons in privity with the United
States as well as private individuals responsible for administering federally
funded and federally supervised programs.241
Since the statutory language in § 201(a) did not adequately define the
scope of the term “public official,” the Court looked to the statute’s legislative
history to ascertain Congress’s intent.242 The Court noted that from the
230
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beginning, “Congress drafted its bribery statutes with broad jurisdictional
language[] . . . .”243 And, prior to the 1962 statutory revisions, federal courts
had interpreted the statutes and the phrase “person acting for or on behalf of
the United States” with expansive reach.244 The Supreme Court believed that
when drafting § 201(a), Congress was aware of prior federal bribery statutes
and the broad judicial interpretation of them.245
Based on this legislative history, the Court held that § 201(a) is a:
“[C]omprehensive statute applicable to all persons
performing activities for or on behalf of the United States,”
whatever the form of delegation of authority. To determine
whether any particular individual falls within this category,
the proper inquiry is not simply whether the person had
signed a contract with the United States or agreed to serve as
the Government’s agent, but rather whether the person
occupies a position of public trust with official federal
responsibilities. Persons who hold such positions are public
officials within the meaning of § 201 and liable for
prosecution under the federal bribery statute.246
The Court clarified that this definition did not apply to all employees of local
organizations responsible for administering federal programs, but instead
“[t]o be a public official under § 201(a), an individual must possess some
degree of official responsibility for carrying out a federal program or
policy.”247 Since petitioners accepted responsibility for distributing funds,
and therefore assumed an official role in administering a federal social service
program, their convictions were affirmed.248
There do not appear to be any reported cases at this time explicitly
deciding whether a union officer is a “public official” within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 201. However, as was stated in United States v. Boffa, § 501 of
243

Id.
Id. at 492.
245
Id. The Court also relied on the House Judiciary Committee’s explicit endorsement of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Levine, 129 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1942), which held that
the defendant’s responsible position made him a “public official,” notwithstanding the absence of a direct
contractual bond between the defendant and the United States. Id. at 493–96.
246
Id. at 496.
247
Id. at 499.
248
Id. at 497, 501. The determination of whether an individual is a “public official” within the meaning
of § 201(a)(1) is a question of law, not fact, and as such it is a matter for resolution by the court. United
States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Post-Dixson cases illustrating the broad, judicial
interpretation of “public official” include United States v. Madeoy, where the court found an appraiser had
official federal responsibilities because the government guaranteed loans based on his recommendations.
Id. Also, in United States v. Strissel, the city housing director administered federal funds in a federal
program, therefore the nature of his responsibilities were clearly federal. United States v. Strissel, 920 F.2d
1162, 1163 (4th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, in Untied States v. Velazquez, the county deputy sheriff
supervised federal inmates and the court found that his responsibilities were federal in nature. United States
v. Velazquez, 847 F.2d 140, 141–43 (4th Cir. 1988).
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the LMRDA (commonly called the Landrum-Griffin Act) is a federal
statutory source for the fiduciary duties of union officials.249 In United States
v. Bane, the Court explained “that in enacting § 501 Congress imposed the
broadest possible fiduciary duty upon union officers and employees.”250 And
in Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, the court described the purpose of § 501 as
being “a direct and far-reaching response to . . . the misuse of union funds and
property by union officials in its every manifestation.”251 The fiduciary duty
imposed by § 501 cannot be waived even by the union’s own governing
instruments.252 Thus, it is clear that union officials “occupy positions of
public trust.”
Section 501 also imposes “federal responsibilities” on union
officials.253 In Phillips v. Osborne, the court explained that the LandrumGriffin Act was passed in response to the McClellan Committee Report,
which uncovered “widespread practices of misappropriation of union funds
and illicit profits by union officers, as well as repeated instances of violence
and racketeering.”254 Congress, therefore, was concerned with regulating the
internal affairs of labor unions in the hope that if unions became internally
more democratic many of those abuses would be eliminated.255 In United
States v. Goad, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[s]ection 501
should be interpreted broadly in order to insure that elected union officials
fulfill their responsibilities as fiduciaries to their members[] . . . .”256 The
Goad court explicitly noted that the union officers’ conduct “are matters of
proper concern to the Federal Government.”257
As fiduciaries occupying positions of public trust and shouldering an
obligation to fulfill their federal responsibilities, a reasonable argument can
be made for the proposition that union officers are “public officials” within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 201, and subject to the risk of federal prosecution
for bribery.258
VI. UNION WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, 18 U.S.C. § 1954
18 U.S.C. § 1954 states, in relevant part:

249

United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 930–31 (3d Cir. 1982).
United States v. Bane, 583 F.2d 832, 834 (6th Cir. 1978).
Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, 454 F.2d 1347, 1354 (7th Cir. 1972).
252
United States v. District Council, 778 F. Supp. 738, 750 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) (“A general exculpatory
provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution
of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by
this section shall be void as against public policy.”).
253
See generally Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1968).
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Id. at 828.
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United States v. Goad, 490 F.2d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 1974).
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Id. at 1163.
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Whoever being—
an administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent,
or employee of any employee welfare benefit plan or
employee pension benefit plan; or
...
an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employee
organization any of whose members are covered by such
plan; or
...
receives or agrees to receive or solicits any fee, kickback,
commission, gift, loan, money, or thing of value because of
or with intent to be influenced with respect to, any of the
actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or
matter concerning such plan or any person who directly or
indirectly gives or offers, or promises to give or offer, any
fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or thing of
value prohibited by this section, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than three years, or both[] . . . .259
In United States v. Kirkland, the court held that in order to establish
a § 1954 violation, the government must prove a motivational link or nexus
“between a thing of value conferred on a trustee and a specific action,
decision, or duty of the trustee who receives the thing of value.”260 The court
also held that the government does not need to prove that a defendant knew
that giving a gratuity was illegal.261
Kirkland involved Capital Consultants Inc. (“CCI”), an investment
firm, for various union employee pension and welfare benefit plans, subject
to 18 U.S.C. § 1954.262 CCI failed, and the plans suffered catastrophic
financial losses, which, in turn, produced drastically reduced union pensions
for retired workers.263 Multiple defendants were indicted for illegally giving
or receiving gratuities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1954.264 The court found
that the defendant Dean Kirkland, (CCI’s principal salesperson), gave
multiple hunting and fishing trips, rifles, and Denver Broncos and Colorado
Rockies sports tickets to persons who were, at the time of receipt, a trustee of
one or more of the plans described in 18 U.S.C. § 1954.265

259
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261
262
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264
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18 U.S.C. § 1954 (2012).
United States v. Kirkland, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1170–71 (D. Or. 2004).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1171–73.
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Regarding the “because of” requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 1954, the
court held that it was enough for the government to prove that the gratuity
giving was made in anticipation of, or because of specific past actions that
Kirkland intended to reward.266 The court rejected the government’s
argument that it need only prove a trustee’s actions or decisions were “a”
motivational factor, however slight, in regard to the gratuity.267 It also
rejected the defense’s request for a “but for” or “primary factor” test in the
giver’s motivation, or the recipient’s motivation, in receiving the thing of
value.268 Rather, since 18 U.S.C. § 1954 did not define the words “because
of,” the court gave these words their ordinary dictionary meanings.269 It held,
then, that the government was required to prove “that a substantial factor in
Dean Kirkland’s motivation to give the thing of value was the trustee’s
specific past or anticipated actions or decisions.”270
On the evidence, the court found proof that Dean Kirkland knew that
making business inroads “would require him to develop personal
relationships with the trustees who made the decisions to place union trust
funds with investment managers like CCI.”271 To that end, Dean Kirkland
was given a generous expense account to entertain trustee and other clients,
and CCI would “write off” those expenses.272 In addition, “[w]hen Dean
Kirkland spent CCI money to entertain clients on hunting and fishing trips,
he targeted the business managers and chairmen of the trusts because they
typically controlled the [money] available for management by CCI.”273
Kirkland also knew that CCI would not continue to approve the hunting and
fishing trips unless the trustee who received the trips ultimately voted to
invest, increase, or maintain their investments in CCI.274 When “scrutiny of
Dean Kirkland’s practices intensified, he attempted to justify the trips by
saying they were for ‘family’ or just ‘friends’ and, in any event, that ‘nobody
will know about it.’”275 The court also found that the recipient of the gratuities
voted in favor of investing substantial funds with CCI.276 Dean Kirkland was
found guilty of multiple counts against him.277
VII. HYPOTHETICAL FACT PATTERN
The managing partners of a hypothetical law firm (hereinafter
referred to as “Law Firm”) know that serious work injuries are frequent
266
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occurrences in the union dominated building construction industry in the city
where Law Firm practices. They also know that injured workers often ask
their union business agents and representatives for the name of a lawyer to
handle their workers’ compensation and third-party litigation claims. The
managing attorneys of Law Firm embark on a campaign to cultivate
relationships with union officials, with several goals in mind:
a) Ingratiate themselves with union officials, so that those
union officials steer their injured members to Law Firm;
b) Obtain the unions’ private membership lists, so that Law
Firm can send its promotional materials via direct mail
to thousands of union members, which is not available to
Law Firm’s competitors;
c) Obtain exclusive use of union halls as satellite law
offices to meet with, and sign up, injured union members
as clients; and
d) Obtain designation as the union’s exclusive law firm for
work-related injuries, which Law Firm can utilize to
attend union meetings and promote itself as the firm
which members are required to use, to the exclusion of
other law firms.
In order to achieve these goals, Law Firm lavishes streams of gifts on union
officials: free meals, sports tickets, golf equipment and outings, free or
discounted legal services to union members for non-injury legal work,
clandestine payments to fund the college expenses for children of union
business agents, and construction implements with Law Firm’s name on them
for union officials to distribute to the union membership.278 As a result of its
efforts, Law Firm achieves its goals, and receives significant amounts of
money from injury cases steered to it by union officials who received this
“stream of benefits.”
Case law clearly indicates that the stream of gifts in this context is
clothed with the hallmarks of corruption. In this hypothetical, the stream of
gifts is made for the purpose of inducing union officials to steer their injured
members to Law Firm, as well as to provide Law Firm with exclusive rights
to its nonpublic membership list and use of its union halls for law firm
business. “The provision of access to material nonpublic information in
return for benefits . . . is certainly misuse of office within the context of an
honest services bribery scheme.”279 As in Runnels and Hausmann, it is no
278
See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Control Components, Inc., No. 09-CR-162 (C.D. Cal.
July 24, 2009) (Defendants in Federal Corrupt Practices Act prosecution pleaded guilty to multiple
violations of the FCPA including payment of college tuition for children of certain persons in exchange
for business advantages).
279
Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2010).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/7

2016]

STEERING OF INJURY CASES

477

defense that the union officials were allegedly acting in the interest of the
membership in having good legal representation, or that the members
received proper workers’ compensation benefits and paid attorneys’ fees as
established by law.
The gifts would appear to fall in the “stream of benefits” theory of
bribery, which is made with the unspoken but obvious intent of retaining the
union official’s services on the “as needed” basis described in Kemp––
anticipated steering of the injured union members “whenever the opportunity
presents itself.” In the hypothetical fact pattern, an honest services fraud case
appears to be viable against the gift-giving attorneys at Law Firm, as well as
the union officials steering injury cases, who are recipients of those gifts and
benefits.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the above analysis demonstrates, there are multiple theories by
which the giving of things of value to union officials as motivation for the
steering of workers’ compensation and personal injury cases may constitute
crimes under federal criminal laws, both as to the attorneys who gave, and the
union officials who received the things of value. First and foremost would be
the “honest services” or “intangible rights” concepts of mail and wire fraud.
Both parties to the activity stated in the hypothetical might also have exposure
to criminal liability pursuant to a RICO analysis, the federal bribery statute,
and the statutory prohibitions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1954 pertaining to
union welfare and pension plans.
The improper giving to union officials may manifest itself in
traditional notions of bribery and kickbacks, or the stealthy and innocuousappearing “stream of benefits.” Regardless of form, the effect is to corrupt
the fiduciary duty of union officials by undermining their independent
judgment on official matters, violate the codes of professional conduct for
attorneys, and cause harm to the public by denying it an informed and
independent choice in obtaining legal services.280 It creates an unfair
competitive advantage for the lawyers who acquire wealth by this illegal
activity––and a distinct disadvantage to the lawyers who compete for business
honestly in the legal marketplace. In order to maintain the integrity of federal
criminal laws and to promote a fair and equal marketplace for legal services,
an objective observer would suggest that law enforcement would be making
good use of federal resources by taking a more active role in investigating and
potentially prosecuting the illegal giving of things of value to union officials
having fiduciary duties, which are made as an inducement for the steering of
280
When an injured union worker is directed by his union official to a specific lawyer, the injured
worker may not get the opportunity to consider other choices for legal representation as he will most likely
follow the recommendation of this higher-up person of authority.
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workers’ compensation and personal injury clients to the gift-giving
attorneys. This activity can be, has been, and should be prosecuted.
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